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COMMENTS
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

IN FLORIDA

INTRODUCTION

In 1943 the Florida legislature adopted a new declaratory judgment
act.' Until that time Florida had available limited declaratory relief
under the 1919 Act 2 which applied only to bills in equity for construction
of a deed, will, contract or other instrument in writing, and for a declaration
of the rights of persons interested therein. This statute was limited to
questions of construction and to the declaration of rights existing under
such construction. 3 The 1943 Act broadens the jurisdiction to afford
relief to any interested person who may be in doubt as to his rights
under a deed, will, contract, memorandum or other legal instrument in
writing and whose rights, status or other legal or equitable relations are
affected by the construction or validity of such writing or by any such
statute, regulation, or municipal ordinance.
Vhat the author has attempted here is a brief survey4 of selected
cases that have arisen under F.S. § 87.01.
AVAILABILITY OF THE REMEDY

There is no language in F.S.A. § 87.01 calling for an "actual
controversy" before the court can assume jurisdiction. Such language can
be found in the federal act 5 and various state acts and was undoubtedly
included to overcome the early rulings of the courts that held declaratory
judgment acts unconstitutional on the ground that the acts authorized
advisory opinions and thus encroached upon the constitutionally established
powers of the judiciary. In Sample v. Ward6 the Florida Supreme Court
refused to set aside a prior declaratory decree construing a will. The
petitioner here alleged there was no "actual controversy" in the prior
proceeding but the court held that an "actual controversy" was not
necessary if the question raised is real and not theoretical and the person
raising it has a bona fide interest under the writing and there is a bona
fide defender.7
I. FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1943).
2. FLA. STAT. § 62.09 (1943).

3. Stuart v. Stephanus, 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767 (1927).
4. For an extensive and comprehensive general treatment of declaratory judgments
see BORCIARD, DECLARATORY JUDCMENTS (2d ed. 1941); 62 HARv. L. REv. 787 (1949).
5. 48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1952).
6. 156 Fla. 210, 23 So.2d 81 (1945).
7. While the Florida Supreme Court holds that no "actual controversy" is necessary, the Federal Act contains the language "actual controversy" thus raising some doubt
as to whether a party could get into the federal courts, on diversity of citizenship for
example, in a case arising under the Florida statute. The phrase "actual controversy",
of course, involves a question of interpretation.
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The court in Ready v. Safeway Rock Co.,8 where the dismissal of a
bill for a declaratory decree to adjudicate Tights under a lease was affirmed,
stated that the test to activate jurisdiction under F.S. § 87.01 is whether
or not the moving party shows that he is in doubt as to the existence
or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege and
that he is entitled to have such doubt removed. The same language
was employed in Caldwell v. North" which involved the construction
of a will.
Necessity of justiciable issue
The court has employed various reasons, expressed or implied, in
its findings of nonjusticiability and refusals to grant declaratory relief.
The court in Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami10 held
that there was no duty upon the city to bargain with the union but
refused to determine whether the city's discrimination against union
members was legal because the union lacked a bona fide and direct
interest in the result, Perhaps the court ignored the fact that the union's
ability to survive would be affected by the continuance of such discrimination.
In City of Pensacola v. Johnson" the court affirmed the dismissal of
a bill for a decree determining whether homesteads in the city of
Pensacola up to the value of $5,000 would be taxable to pay municipal
auditorium bonds if authorized at a special election. It appeared that
uncertainty surrounding other future events was the reason for dismissal.
Lack of adverse parties apparently caused dismissal of bills for
declaratory relief in Deen v. Weaver12 where the court stated that F.S.
§ 87.01 cannot be employed to point out the procedure for an attorney
to litigate an action; Ervin v. City of Miami Beach 3 where the only
"issue" was the question of whether the opinion of the Attorney General
construing certain statutes was correct and the relief sought by the city
was, in effect, an advisory opinion; and State v. Lewis' 4 where the petition,
of a clerk of a court for a declaratory decree construing the law fixing
transportation allowances for jurors, named no parties defendant or
respondent and no process was issued.
The court has also dismissed a bill for a declaratory decree seeking
a determination of whether an act of the Board of County Commissioners
making application to a state agency for construction and financing

8.
9.
10.
11.

157
157
157
159

Fla.
Fla.
Fla.
Fla.

27, 24 So.2d 808 (1946).
52, 24 So.2d 806 (1946).
445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946
566, 28 So.2d 905 (1947).

12. 47 So.2d 539 (Fla, 1950

13. 66 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1953).
14. 72 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1954).
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from certain state funds was a valid exercise of the Board's power. It was
held that the questions presented were premature since the application
had not been approved, nor had there been approval of the legal and
fiscal sufficiencies of the bonds. 15 Prematurity of issue was also involved
in Bryant v. Gray 16 where a suit for a declaratory decree construing
sections of the state constitution on the Governor's eligibility for re-election
was dismissed because petitioner merely alleged that he might seek
re-election.
Coral Gates Properties, Inc. v. Hodes17 involved a bill for declaratory
relief based upon an alleged oral real estate brokerage contract. There
was material dispute as to the terms, performance, and breach. The
court held that declaratory relief was not available and that the action
should have been in contract. The court stated that the purpose of the
suit was not for the construction of an oral contract, where the terms
of such contract were not in dispute but was for the purpose of obtaining
a money judgment under an oral contract the terms and performance of
which were disputed. (emphasis supplied) There was interesting dicta
to the effect that F.S. § 87.01 may (emphasis by court) apply to an
oral contract when the terms are not in dispute and where there may be
some doubt as to the proper interpretation, or as to the existence or
nonexistence of some right, statutes, immunity, power or privilege.
Judicial discretion in granting relief
Although requirements of justiciability and jurisdiction are met it
does not follow that a court will automatically issue a declaration. What
is the effect of the existence of an alternative remedy?
1) Other cause of action.'8 In Miller v. Doss' a suit against the tax
assessor for a declaratory decree claiming that the assessor had arbitrarily
exempted certain property from taxation was maintained notwithstanding
the existence of another adequate remedy. Lockleer v. City of West Palm
Beach2 ° was a suit in which the city filed for a declaratory decree against
Lockleer because of a dispute as to who was the senior officer in the police department. The court held that under the facts of the case it was appropriate
for the city to have recourse to a declaratory decree, notwithstanding that
the remedy of quo warranto was also available. In Bowden v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R.,2 1 which concerned a dispute arising from uncertainty in
a deed the defendant had received conveying to it a right of way across
land, which the plaintiff later acquired, the court affirmed dismissal of
15. City of Hollywood v. Broward County, 54 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1951).
16. 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954)17. 59 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1952).

18. FLA.

STAT.

f 87.02 (1953) provides that the existence of another adequate

remedy shall not preclude a decree for declaratory relief.
19. 36 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1948).
20. 51 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1951).
21. 47 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1950).
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plaintiff's bill for declaratory decree. The grounds were that plaintiff
did not come under F.S. § 87.01 because he had no rights under this
instrument (plaintiff claimed under another deed) and that the real
purpose of the bill was an attempt to use the declaratory statute in lieu
of an ejectment suit. "Obviously, ejectment is his [appellant] proper
remedy." Would declaratory relief have been available if the plaintiff
had rights under the particular instrument? In Stark v. Marshall,22 which
involved a boundary line dispute, the court stated that where ejectment
will lie it is the appropriate remedy and such a dispute cannot be litigated
under the dcclaratory judgments statute. Also in Cape Sable Corp. v.
McClurg, ' involving a suit by a purchaser at a sheriff's sale for a declaratory
decree declaring plaintiff's rights to the land, which was in defendant's
possession, the court held that upon the facts the proper remedy is an
action of ejectment.
2) Pendancy of another suit. In Taylor v. Cooper24 the court held that
declaratory relief was not authorized where all other matters attempted
to be presented could be set up as defenses in criminal suits pending
against applicant. It was further stated that declaratory relief may not
be invoked when there is a suit pending over the same subject matter
and the identical issues may properly be determined.
3) Special statutory remedy. In Bessemer Properties Inc. v. City of
Opa Locka' the court held that an action for a declaratory decree
validating certificates of indebtedness to be issued by the city should have
been brought under F.S. § 75.01 which specifically authorized validation
of certificates, rather than under the declaratory judgment statute. Yet
in an earlier case, North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside,' the court
allowed the use of a declaratory decree to determine the validity of public
improvement bonds issued by the Town of Surfside. The court held that
F.S. § 75.01 is not an exclusive remedy for the validation of public
bonds. The decision in the North Shore Bank case appears to be supported
by numerous Florida cases. 27 In the Bessemer Properties case the court
attempted to distinguish the earlier North Shore Bank case on the grounds
that the bonds in the Bessemer case were for a public purpose.
4) Fact finding. One section of the declaratory judgment Statute provides that a decree may be rendered as to the existence or nonexistence
of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of any immunity,
22. 67 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1953).
23, 74 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1954).

24. 60 So.2d 534 (Fa. 1952).
25. 74 So.2d 296 (Fa. 1954).
26. 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
27. Bessemer Properties v. MacVicar, 63 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1953); Bessemer Properties v. Peters, 51 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1951); City of Jacksonville v. Nichols Engineering &
Research Corp., 49 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1956); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Peters, 43 So.2d
448 (Fla. 1949).
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power, privilege or right may depend. 28
. ..

an issue of fact,

...

Another section provides that

may be tried and determined

.

.

."

by a

jury.29 It appears that the court will not allow the use of a declaratory
judgment to determine doubt only as to questions of fact. Columbia
0 was an action to determine the liability
Casualty Co. v. Zimmermang
of the insurer for injuries inflicted while the insured's automobile was
being driven by another. The only doubt which existed was whether
the automobile was being driven with the knowledge and consent of the
insured. The Supreme Court held that the real question which plaintiff
sought to have determined was a purely factual one and there was no
question involved of the construction or validity of an instrument. Halpert
v. Oleksy71 was a proceeding by lessees for a decree that the lease of
the premises, which had burned down, was cancelled and that the lessors
should be required to' return a security deposit because of alleged breaches
of various lease terms. The cancellation of the lease was admitted by
both parties, each of the parties claiming damages for the alleged breaches.
In holding that a declaratory decree was not applicable and that the case
should be tried in contract, the Supreme Court found no doubt asserted
by either party as to the terms or meaning of any provision of the lease.
The court stated that "Doubt, because of disputed questions of fact
alone, is not sufficient, especially when the only relief sought is damages."
PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS

Status
3 the plaintiff wife
Marital. In the case of de Marigny v. de Marigny7
attempted to use a declaratory decree to determine the validity of a
Florida divorce granted the defendant husband and his former spouse.
The court denied the use of declaratory relief on the grounds that F.S.
§ 87.01 was not meant to be applied to judgments or decrees. The court
was assisted to its decision by the decree which was clear and unambiguous.
The court stated that "the only tenable exception to the rule that a
declaratory judgment is not an appropriate method of questioning a final
judgment or decree (valid on the face of the record) is in the case the
judgment or decree has become the source of definite rights and is unclear
or ambiguous." It would appear that what the court is discussing here
is clarification of a final decree or judgment. Declaratory judgment proceedings have been used in such cases. 33 'What the plaintiff was attempting

28.
29.
30.
31.

FLA. STAT. * 87.01 (1943).
FLA. STAT. § 87.08 (1943).

62 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1953).
65 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1953).

32. 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
33. Avery Freight Lines v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 18 So.2d 394 (1944); accord,
Solvay Process Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 596
(1941). Contra: J. Greenbaurn Tanning Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1942).
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here was more than mere clarification. The court went on to say that
"our declaratory decree statute is no substitute for established procedure
for review of final judgments or decrees. Nor is it a device for collateral
attack upon them" (emphasis supplied). Does the court mean by this
last sentence that a divorced spouse could not ask for a declaration of the
validity of an ex parte foreign divorce decree? Perhaps it would be
best to restrict the court's broad language to the facts of the present case.
Plaintiff was not even able to maintain an independent bill in equity since
she did not have such interest in the former decree as would allow her, a
third party, to collaterally attack it.
'4
Profession and employment. Watson v. Centro Espanol de Tampa
was a case where a statute defining and punishing the practice of medicine
without a license was ambiguous as to non-licensed hospital interns employed
to aid a medical director. The court held an intern could maintain a
petition for a declaratory decree adjudicating his rights under the statute.
Other. The court recently held that an action for a declaratory decree
would lie to determine plaintiff's right to function as chairman of the
"5
Republican Party Executive Committee. 1
Constitutionality and construction of legislation
Actions for declaratory decrees have been maintained in the following
instances: a suit against county commissioners to declare unconstitutional
a statute relating to the public health service of the City of Tampa and
County of Hillsborough; 6 a suit by a candidate whose name would
appear on the ballot for a construction of the statute providing for arrangement of names of all candidates of each party in separate perpendicular
columns on the ballot; 7 a suit against the City of Miami to determine
the validity of a liquor licensing ordinance; 38 an action against the Board
of Public Instructions to determine the validity of the statute forbidding
school fraternities; 9 a suit by lessors of wires used to transmit information
about horse racing for a determination of the validity of a statute regulating
the use of private wires by public utility companies; 40 and a bill by a
taxpayer for determination of the constitutionality of legislation authorizing
expenditures of county monies.4 1
34.
35.
36.
37.

(1944).

158 Fla. 796, 30 So.2d 288 (1947).
Shelly v. Brewer, 68 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1953).
Ball v. Branch, 154 Fla. 57, 16 So.2d 524 (1944).
Cobb v. Board of Comm'rs of Orange County, 155 Fla. 60, 19 So.2d 505

38. City of Miami v. Kichinko, 156 Fla. 87, 22 So.2d 627 (1945).
39. Satan Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 22 So.2d 892
(1945).
40. Mclnerny v. Ervin, 46 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1950).
41. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, In and For Dade County, 56
So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
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Taxation
State v. Everglades Drainage District 2 involved a suit by the Attorney
General to obtain a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Everglades Drainage District taxes upon state lands. The lower court dismissed
the bill on the merits of the issue, holding that all questions raised by
the complaint had been answered contrary to the contentions of the
Attorney General in former opinions of the Supreme Court. In affirming
the dismissal the Supreme Court stated that it did not think the declaratory
judgment statute contemplated this kind of a suit. No reasons were
stated for this conclusion.
Powers and duties of public authorities
A suit was brought by the mayor against the city commission in
Alsop v. Pierce43 for a declaration as to the rights, powers, and jurisdiction
of the respective parties under the city charter. The city commission
contended that such a controversy was not a proper one under the
declaratory judgment statute, but the Supreme Court stated ". . . it
would be difficult to find a more appropriate case. . . ." A suit was
brought by the State Board of Control to obtain a declaratory judgment
in Oberman v. State Board of Control44 for construction of a statute
authorizing payment of $3,000 per year for each student enrolled in the
first accredited medical school in the state. As a result of this suit such
funds were made available to the University of Miami Medical School.
A declaratory decree was also obtained in Riviere v. Orlando Parking
Commission for the City of OrlandoB to determine the commission's
authority under certain statutes to acquire land and establish off street
parking facilities.
SUMMARY

Florida's modem declaratory judgment statute generally has been
given a liberal interpretation by the Supreme Court in most cases.
Selected instances in which the court has, erroneously or otherwise, refused
to grant declaratory relief have been discussed. The declaratory judgment
should not be considered an extraordinary remedy or a strange or unusual
form of action. It is an ordinary, simple, auxiliary remedy and one of
the most desirable of the newly developed procedural devices.
Eugene Parker

42. 155 Fla. 403, 20 So.2d 397 (1945[
43. 155 Ha. 185, 19 aSo.2d 799 (1944 .
44. 62 So.2d 696 (Fl 1952).
45. 74 So.2d 694 (a. 1954).

